Getting Read In to the Program

 

Introduction

On October 14, 2024, in Arc Dream's official Delta Green Discord server, a number of users were discussing the Program's process for reading an Agent into its Special Access Program (SAP). User Doleco made the following comment:

So, this post is my attempt at doing just that. Thanks, Doleco!

The Program's Recruitment Process

I'm not going to go too much into the Program's recruitment process, since the Handler's Guide already does an amazing job of breaking it down step-by-step (see pages 264 to 265). To briefly summarize, the process looks like this:

1. Exposure to the unnatural
2. Assessing the potential recruit's Response to the unnatural
3. Conducting an Investigation of the potential recruit's personal and professional background
4. Briefing the recruit into the Program

In this post, I'm going to articulate my thoughts on the Investigation and Briefing phases. Take them for what they're worth; at the end of the day, none of this is official. These are just my thoughts on what the background investigation and briefing might require or entail.

Investigation and Assessment

As stated in the Handler's Guide, the Program's Office of Security (D1) investigates potential recruits after their exposure and response to the unnatural have been assessed. This involves a deep dive into the recruit's "background, hobbies, habits, family, and friends for signs that the recruit can be trusted with the Program’s secrets" (p. 265). While this may seem like a monumental task, much of this work will have already been done if the recruit holds a security clearance (e.g., a TOP SECRET clearance). 

In order to get a security clearance, a nominee is required to fill out and submit a Standard Form (SF) 86, also known as the Questionnaire for National Security Positions. The SF-86 covers the last 10 years of the nominee's life, including past residences, education, previous employment, military experience (if applicable), marriages, relatives, criminal history, and more. The nominee is required to identify several references that can validate items like where they lived and went to school, as well as three personal references that can attest to their character and general suitability for access to classified information. Once the SF-86 is complete, an Investigation Service Provider (ISP) carries out the background investigation itself, including reaching out to and interviewing all listed references. Today, the primary ISP for all security clearances issued to federal employees is the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA). Prior to 2019, these investigations were conducted by the Office of Personnel Management, specifically its Federal Investigative Services Division (until 2016) and the National Background Investigations Bureau (from 2016 to 2019).

One thing to note is that the days of reoccurring background investigations are over, even for those currently holding security clearances. This is due to the massive backlog of reinvestigations and the amount of time and manpower required to conduct them. As of 2018, once an individual is granted a security clearance, they are enrolled in process called Continuous Evaluation (CE) or Continuous Vetting (CV). In short, organizations like the DCSA's Adjudication and Vetting Services (AVS) routinely submit a security clearance holder's Social Security Number (SSN) and other identifying information through various national databases. The AVS specifically looks for derogatory alerts related to terrorism, foreign travel, financial activity, criminal activity, credit, public records, and general eligibility. To support this process, a security clearance holder is required to re-submit an updated SF-86 every five years.

Considering the broad access the Program has to government information, both legitimate and illicit, it wouldn't take much for them to obtain a potential recruit's SF-86. With this file in hand, all D1 would have to do is re-interview listed references under the guise of another security clearance investigation. Additional digging could be done into the recruit's finances, medical and mental health history, and other areas of potential interest. With access to the National Security Agency (NSA) and constitutional rights being a mere afterthought, deep dives of a recruit's online presence (ranging from social media profiles to dating apps) could be carried out to further develop a profile.

Once all this information is collected, what exactly would D1 look for when reviewing it? In my mind, they would look for the same factors that are assessed with clandestine human intelligence (HUMINT) sources. These factors are summarized by the acronym PAMSSA.

1. Placement: What is the recruit's current placement within or proximity to the federal government? 
2. Access: What information, resources, experience, or subject matter expertise does the recruit have access to that will be of use to the Program?
3. Motivation: What motivated the recruit to enter their current profession? What could motivate them to accept the Program's recruitment pitch and continue working for the Program?
4. Suitability: Based on the outcomes of Phases 1 and 2 of the recruitment process, how suitable is the recruit to work within the Program and pursue its objectives?
5. Susceptibility: How likely is the recruit to accept the Program's recruitment pitch (i.e., how susceptible are they to recruitment)? Conversely, how susceptible is the recruit to disenfranchisement, disillusionment, or favorably responding to recruitment by the opposition?
6. Accessibility: How accessible is the recruit to the Program, especially when it comes to operational tasking? Will strings need to be pulled to place the recruit elsewhere in the federal government to better ensure availability?

Once a recruit's background and PAMSSA factors have been assessed, D1 will ultimately make the call as to whether the Program should proceed with recruitment, or if the prospective recruit is better off as a "Friendly." If it's the former, the recruit is sent to the National Capital Region (NCR) for indoctrination into the Program.

Indoctrination

In my Delta Green, the recruit is summoned (typically via official orders, if they're already a federal law enforcement officer or government employee) to the Emerson Corporate Commons at 8920 Stephens Road, Laurel, Maryland 20723. The building is two stories tall, sitting on almost three acres and consisting of nearly 30,000 square feet in office space. It is a suitably non-descript office building and a perfect location to house the Program's administrative operations.  A bonus is its close proximity to Washington, DC, Fort Meade (the NSA's headquarters), and other federal agencies. While there are a number of windows on the exterior of the facility, all have been tinted and treated to prevent outside observation and thwart adversarial technical surveillance.

With the exception of the lobby and bathrooms on the first floor, the entire facility has been dual accredited as a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) and Special Access Program Facility (SAPF). Access is strictly controlled; the lobby is manned by both a cleared receptionist and cleared private security guards from the Breckenridge Corporation. To enter the secure areas of the building, one must pass through metal and cell phone detectors; send their personal belongings through an X-ray scanner at a security checkpoint; present their access badge to a card reader; and enter a seven-digit Personal Identification Number (PIN). Cameras are positioned throughout the lobby and are monitored around the clock by Breckenridge personnel.

As a visitor, the recruit is required to check in with the receptionist at the front desk. They're asked to provide their identification and fill out a sign-in sheet. Requested information includes full name, date of birth, last four digits of their SSN, and a phone number. Once the recruit has signed in, they are granted a red visitor's badge that clearly identifies them as an uncleared visitor requiring escort. To get their identification back, the recruit must turn in their badge at the end of their visit. The receptionist asks them to take a seat in one of the faux leather chairs across from their desk and makes a brief phone call. Within five to ten minutes, the recruit's escort emerges from within the bowels of the facility. Unbeknownst to the recruit, the escort is a member of the Office of Security. The escort introduces themselves by first name only (unlikely to be their true first name), confirms the recruit's identity, and asks them to surrender any and all personal electronic devices. These devices are stored in lockboxes near the security checkpoint leading into the facility's secure spaces. Once these formalities are concluded, the escort walks the visitor past the security checkpoint and up to Suite 202 on the second floor.

Presentation of an access badge and PIN is required whenever the escort transitions from one area to another. White noise generators in the ceiling tiles pump out a constant drone of static, rendering the hushed tones of nearby conversation virtually unintelligible. Besides sterile hallways and stairwells, it is obvious extensive steps are taken to prevent the recruit from seeing or hearing anything they aren't accessed to. Blinking red lights mounted at regular intervals in the ceiling let facility occupants know that an uncleared visitor is present, and the processing of sensitive information likely comes to a complete halt until the recruit arrives at Suite 202. Once inside the suite, the escort brings the recruit to an unlabeled conference room consisting of a table, chairs, a secure video teleconference station, and little else.

Inside the conference room, the recruit is greeted by the individual who will later become their case officer, a senior representative from D1, and a senior manager from the Office of the Director. As the Handler's Guide suggests, this manager is likely a high-ranking member of federal law enforcement, the military, or the Intelligence Community. All present will introduce themselves, offer the recruit a seat, and immediately slide over a Department of Defense Form 2836, also known as a Special Access Program Indoctrination Agreement (SAPIA).

The SAPIA states that, upon signing, the recruit will be briefed to SAP information. Their signature officially documents their agreement that they will handle and protect such information accordingly. The name of the SAP is up to the Handler, but as the Handler's Guide states, it's never DELTA GREEN. I've used Michael Fogelman's random phrase generator in the past to come up with innocuous-sounding cover names for the Program. Examples include POLITIC PERMIT, DOMINO PRELUDE, and PASSIVE SULFUR.

The recruit is told they are to be briefed to a sensitive, ongoing government effort protected within SAP channels, and until they sign the SAPIA, no other information can be provided. All the briefers can say is that it's related to incidents the recruit witnessed or investigated previously. If the recruit refuses to sign, they are thanked for their time and promptly escorted out of the facility. They will be monitored by D1 and continuously assessed for future recruitment, until the call is eventually made to either bring them back in or forget about them entirely...once, of course, D1 is satisfied they will remain silent about what they've seen and heard.

If the recruit signs the SAPIA, the senior manager from D0 will go over the topics articulated on page 265 of the Handler's Guide. They may also state the Program's goals and beliefs, as outlined on page 259. If the recruit has questions, answers are in short supply. Any information provided should tie back to the briefing's key points. The importance of compartmentalization is stressed to the recruit, so beyond what they've already experienced in the field leading up to their recruitment, nothing else can be confirmed. The horrors of the recruit's inciting incident will be emphasized in the briefing, as will the importance of ensuring future incursions are prevented or mitigated. The briefer, and the prospective case officer, will make use of their pre-existing knowledge of the recruit's motivations to get them onboard.

If the recruit agrees to join the Program, their case officer will welcome them and tell them to expect a phone call. Nothing else needs to be said. Another escort from D1 will walk them out of the facility, and the recruit will return to their car with information they will likely one day regret ever knowing.

If the recruit declines to join the Program, the end result is largely the same as if they refused to sign the SAPIA. They are thanked for their time, but they are also informed they will be charged under the Espionage Act if they divulge anything they heard during the briefing. The recruit is then escorted out of the facility and tagged for continued monitoring by D1 for signs of compromise. A future recruitment pitch may be possible, but only if something significant enough occurs in the recruit's life to potentially alter their motivations or susceptibility. Otherwise, they will likely fade into unimportance and largely be forgotten by the Program...unless, of course, they end up becoming a threat to its operations.

With that, I sincerely hope you found this post informative. Even more, I hope it gives you some material to mine for your own games. Let me know if you have any questions or if there's any topics you'd like me to cover in future posts. Take care of yourselves, and until next time...

Be seeing you,

Vince